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Each asterisked item above will be defined and discussed in turn to investigate how MAVs could play a potential future role in Air Force functions across the spectrum of military operations. (The definition of each term presented here is as given in AFDD 1.) But before doing so, it is necessary to address a number of MAV limitations that could have significant effects on how well these functions are performed. These limitations should be kept in mind in any discussion of potential MAV applications.
MAV Operational Limitations
The most obvious limitations to micro-air vehicle capabilities will be in range, autonomy, precision, endurance, damage potential, and from weather. Ways to mitigate these limitations will have to be found if MAVs are to achieve their full promise.
Range
The limited range of Micro-air vehicles requires these vehicles to be delivered to the vicinity of their desired operating locations. To this end a number of alternatives have been proposed. MAVs could be dispensed by manned aircraft, larger UAVs (to include cruise missiles), or munitions. This concept is similar to the new Low Cost Autonomous Attack System by a tactical munitions dispenser.130 Another alternative is to package MAVs for delivery via artillery rounds such as 120-millimeter mortar tubes or 155-millimeter howitzers in much the same way that the Army’s Tactical Missile System delivers Brilliant Anti-Tank rounds over large distances.131
Micro-air vehicle ranges will also be constrained by inherent transmission and reception limitations. Small antenna and miniaturized avionics will necessitate MAVs having to remain close to their launch controllers and/or intended recipients of video or other data. Enemy jamming could prove problematic given their power advantage. One way around this constraint would be to use MAVs in swarms wherein communication ranges are decreased through use of point-to-point relay. Alternatively, a “mother ship” concept could be employed where an airborne relay loiters above a MAV operating area to serve as a signal booster.
Autonomy
To the extent that micro-air vehicles are autonomous, they will have greater ability to carry out their missions without supporting elements such as human flight controllers. However some missions, such as military operations in urban terrain, will only be accomplished with limited effectiveness until capabilities such as autonomous obstacle avoidance can be incorporated.
Precision
Lack of positional precision in micro-air vehicle location will constrain their use in targeting, strike, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue. For example, target geo-location uncertainties are a strong driver in weapons selection. Battle damage assessments will be made more difficult should it be unclear which among several similar-looking targets in close proximity, a MAV is imaging. A lack of precision in search and rescue might cause rescue crews to encounter threats that might otherwise be avoided with precise downed aircrew location data.
Endurance
Longer endurance enhances most Air Force functions. Longer operation translates into greater mission flexibility and less frequent need to replace expended MAVs. It also means fewer systems will have to be purchased which saves costs. This is why progress in energy generation and storage capabilities for MAVs is so important.
Damage Potential
Micro-air vehicles are small. Thus, the effectiveness of any mini-munitions they are capable of delivering will be directly dependent on being extremely accurate in delivery and incorporating a sufficiently energetic blast. Potentially an area for system engineering trade-offs, advances in precision navigation and munitions technologies will enhance the damage potential of MAVs. However, for the near- to mid-term, it would be unrealistic to expect MAVs to be capable of anything greater than a very localized destructive effect.
Weather
As discussed earlier, micro-air vehicles are sensitive to disturbances in the atmosphere. Aerodynamic control will be difficult under conditions of moderate to high winds and precipitation; thus, image stabilization for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance variants will be a challenge. The upper limit for MAV operations in winds may be no more than thirty miles per hour. This limitation may be particularly restrictive in urban settings where buildings are known to facilitate the production of local gusts and downdrafts.132
Aerospace Power Functions Applicable to MAVs
Offensive Counterair (OCA)
OCA consists of operations to destroy, neutralize, disrupt, or limit enemy air and missile power as close to its source as possible and at a time and place of [one’s] choosing. OCA operations include the suppression of enemy air defense targets, such as aircraft and surface-to-air missiles or local defense systems, and their supporting [command and control].
Micro-air vehicles could support offensive counterair in a number of ways. The vignette presented at the start of Chapter 1 in which MAVs were used to damage enemy fighters through foreign object damage is one such way. MAVs could also be used as target beacons for precision strikes against enemy aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and command and control assets. MAVs outfitted with mini-explosives could be used to damage these targets to put them temporarily out of action. MAV stealth might be a particularly strong asset in helping locate enemy radars that otherwise would refrain from emitting for fear of attack from hunter-killer platforms.
Interdiction
Interdiction consists of operations to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. . . . Interdiction attacks enemy [command and control] systems, personnel, materiel, logistics, and their supporting systems to weaken and disrupt the enemy’s efforts.
Micro-air vehicles could support interdiction in much the same way as they would offensive counterair. The nature and size of the target set, is however, more varied and in some respects more vulnerable.
Close Air Support (CAS)
“CAS consists of air operations against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces.” Micro-air vehicles in support of close air support would most likely find application enhancing combat identification through use of identification friend or foe or target tagging. They might also be used in target designation for precision-guided munitions. If equipped for imaging, MAVs might also perform a forward air controller type mission in support of the close air support function.
Strategic Attack
Strategic attack is defined as those operations intended to directly achieve strategic effects by striking at the enemy’s [centers of gravity (COG)]. These operations are designed to achieve their objectives without first having to necessarily engage the adversary’s fielded military forces in extended operations at the operational and tactical levels of war. COGs are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.
If the enemy’s fielded forces are a center of gravity, then the nature of micro-air vehicle support to strategic attack is subsumed by the other aerospace power functions described herein. If, however, an enemy’s centers of gravity are rooted more in the enemy’s heartland (such as his electric power grid, transportation infrastructure, leadership, etc…), then MAV contributions go beyond that characteristic the above functions. MAVs may jam communications nodes, disrupting key utilities and industries, attack soft targets, and thus demoralize the enemy and reduce his will to fight. This last application might be accomplished simply through the frustration caused by having to deal with swarming MAVs that seem to be everywhere at all times making life difficult if not outright dangerous. A populace might feel no less helpless than the poor soldiers in the trenches of World War I who faced the constant onslaught of artillery fire.
Naturally, the deeper the center of gravity is behind enemy lines, the greater the need for long-range micro-air vehicle delivery means and for autonomous operation. If requirements extend to reconnoitering and/or conducting harassment operations inside leadership buildings and other interior locations, the MAVs to conduct these missions will need to be more sophisticated with advanced navigation and power systems.
Offensive Counterinformation (OCI)
OCI includes actions taken to control the information environment . . . [with t]he purpose [of] disabl[ing] selected enemy information operations. OCI operations are designed to destroy, degrade, or limit enemy information capabilities . . . Examples of OCI include jamming radars and corrupting data acquisition, transformation, storage, or transmissions of an adversary’s information; psychological operations; deception; and physical or cyber attack.
The same (or similar) micro-air vehicles that can jam radar systems as described above, can deceive radar systems rather than jam them outright. MAVs could also conduct deception by supporting feints and diversionary attacks as well as broadcasting bogus friendly signals. Executing cyber warfare or information system attacks via MAVs will be possible to the extent that an enemy’s cyber and information systems are accessible through communications infrastructure or industrially implanted “trap doors.” Should MAVs ever advance to the point that they can land on transmission lines (copper or glass) and tap into them, they will be able to extend their offensive counterinformation operations beyond the realm of the radio frequency spectrum.
Command and Control (C2)
C2 includes the battlespace management process of planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations. C2 involves the integration of the systems of procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and communications designed to enable a commander to exercise command and control across the range of military operations.
The most obvious ways in which micro-air vehicles could support the command and control function are by enabling communications and providing own force surveillance. It is unlikely that MAVs will supplant more robust systems in which the USAF has invested over the years to support its current communications and force tracking infrastructure. However, MAVs could find a niche supporting command and control in unique situations such as over-the-horizon communications as part of a force protection scheme in a newly secured operating zone or imaging friendly operations to ensure they are proceeding according to commander’s intent.
Special Operations Employment
Special operations employment is the use of airpower operations (denied territory mobility, surgical firepower, and special tactics) to conduct the following special operations functions: unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, and counter-proliferation. To execute special operations, Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) are normally organized and employed in small formations capable of both independent and supporting operations, with the purpose of enabling timely and tailored responses across the range of military operations.
Uniquely distinctive from normal conventional operations, AFSOF may accomplish tasks at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war or other contingency operations through the conduct of low-visibility, covert, or clandestine military actions. AFSOF are usually conducted in enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territories and may complement or support general-purpose force operations.”
This extensive quote from AFDD 1 was necessary to bring out two things. First, it is the function most amenable to micro-air vehicle capabilities given their current developmental impetus on supporting small ground force operations (as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, offensive counterinformation, targeting, and deception assets) at least to the extent the special operations employment function involves Air Force personnel on the ground in enemy territory. Second, special operations employment is the function most likely to emphasize the MAV’s qualities of low-visibility, redundancy, persistence and covertness.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Intelligence provides clear, brief, relevant, and timely analysis on foreign capabilities and intentions for planning and conducting military operations. . . . [I]ntelligence gives commanders the best available estimate of enemy capabilities, COGs, and courses of action.
Surveillance is the function of systematically observing air, space, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is a continuing process, not oriented to a specific ‘target.’
Reconnaissance complements surveillance in obtaining, by visual observation or other detection methods, specific information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or in securing data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance generally has a time constraint associated with the tasking.
The value micro-air vehicles may have for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance function has already been made apparent. MAVs could contribute across this spectrum by ascertaining ground and electronic order of battle to supporting the intelligence activity of targeteering. These functions would be accomplished using data gathered by MAV imagers, communications intercepts, and signals intelligence analyses. MAVs may also be an innovative tool to conduct post-strike battle damage assessments. MAVs could be fitted to ride piggyback on a precision-guided munition. After launch into the target area, the munition and MAV would separate before weapon impact with the latter loitering to provide images of the weapon’s effect. Advantages to such a scheme include lowered combat risk (by obviating the need for post-strike battle damage assessment by manned reconnaissance), better and more timely battle damage assessments especially as regards weapons effectiveness and possible need for re-attack, as well as cost savings in operations and logistics.
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
CSAR consists of those air operations conducted to recover distressed personnel during wartime or military operations other than war. The most likely concept of operation involving the combat search and rescue function has micro-air vehicles signaling rescue forces on the whereabouts of distressed personnel. Other possibilities include MAVs providing “overhead” imagery to enhance downed aircrew and rescue party situational awareness, serving as communications relays, and assisting in SEAD operations during an entire rescue operation from ingress, through extraction to egress of the rescue team. Should MAV range capabilities become sufficient, MAVs could perform as “homing pigeons” to lead combat search and rescue teams back to the exact location a downed aircrew launched the MAV, even providing encapsulated messages to preclude communications intercept.133 When it is difficult to isolate the exact current location of distressed personnel, blanketing a region with MAVs might be a particularly efficient way to support wide area search activities.
MAV Employment Contexts
As has been shown, micro-air vehicles can be used in many different ways to support a wide variety of Air Force functions. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that they would have utility across the spectrum of military operations from peacetime to combat involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This section will explore MAV support to Air Force functions within the various contexts making up the spectrum of conflict beginning with military operations short of war working through increasing levels of conflict.
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).
“Military operations other than war” is a “catch-all” term used to describe a number of different activities military forces can be engaged in short of general war. It includes border and area patrol, humanitarian operations, peace operations, support during domestic crises, non-combatant evacuation operations, and anti-terrorism.
Border and Area Patrol. Border patrol operations are generally a peacetime operation. Its purpose is generally to support activities such as homeland defense, illegal immigration control, and to stop drug smuggling. Here, the crucial functions are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Military involvement typically occurs in cooperation with other agencies. In this case, micro-air vehicles may not be a more cost-effective solution than larger UAV or aerostat alternatives. Further, Air Force involvement is may not be appropriate.
If, however, the purpose of the patrols is in the context of counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Air Force micro-air vehicles equipped to search for evidence of such weapons could have a role. This role would depend, of course, on such factors as the geographical circumstances and political environment. MAVs could augment national overhead surveillance assets to keep suspect complexes under continuous scrutiny and to sniff for traces of agents associated with the manufacture and storage of these weapons.
Humanitarian Operations. Humanitarian operations extend from airlift of medical supplies and foodstuffs to people who have experienced a natural disaster to managing refugee relief camps. Many times such operations must be conducted in remote locales where public infrastructure facilities have been severely stressed or are non-existent.
Micro-air vehicles could prove useful in such contexts as a means to survey the extent of disasters or to provide communication links to replace lost commercial nodes. They could also locate trapped personnel using aerial surveillance and serve as homing beacons to guide rescue personnel. In this regard they might be the only safe alternative for searching for survivors inside burning buildings or amidst rubble from earthquakes or terrorist bombings. Air Force involvement would probably be limited to provision of such assets at the commencement of humanitarian missions until full up emergency relief teams arrive on scene with their own.
Peace Operations. Peace operations are generally divided into peace keeping and peace enforcement. Because peace keeping rests upon the mutual interests of the conflicting parties to avoid bloodshed, the probability of armed conflict is lower than in the case of peace enforcement where the parties to conflict may wish to keep fighting. Accordingly, peace keeping forces tend to be more lightly armed and their rules of engagement more conservative. Peace enforcers, on the other hand, need to be ready to demonstrate more resolve to keep conflict from flaring up.
In such contexts the most likely role for micro-air vehicles is again as surveillance platforms. In some ways their stealth may detract from the demonstration of presence that enhances the peace operation. The surveillance role would not be restricted to imaging as signals intelligence would also be of value to monitor communications levels. Should peace degenerate into combat, MAVs could be used by isolated forces in much the same way as described earlier for combat search and rescue operations.
In all likelihood, micro-air vehicles will be organic to the ground-based force. However, Air Force involvement may be necessary for wide area operations too large to be continuously monitored by a limited ground force.
Domestic Crises. For the purposes of this paper, domestic crises refers specifically to situations of imminent danger as in riots, stand-offs between groups threatening violence and law enforcement personnel, and natural or man-made disasters in progress. In riot situations micro-air vehicles could prove particularly adept at providing reconnaissance in urban settings where tall buildings block line-of-sight. The psychological impact of MAVs should not be underestimated as the mere observation of the presence of MAVs might serve notice to the rioting masses (or leadership if there is one) that they are being monitored continuously. This could also act to complicate attempts by those wishing to manipulate rioting crowds to their own ends. Images taken by MAVs could aid in post-riot law enforcement efforts to prosecute criminal actions. MAVs could be used to provide pinpoint delivery of crowd control agents such as tear gas thereby reducing the chaos that sometimes ensues over a wide area when these measures are employed. In ‘Waco-style’ stand-offs, MAVs could be used to deliver knockout agents to subdue hostage takers before they realize what is going on. While severe weather would constrain MAV operations, they could still prove their value reconnoitering the extent of floods, chemical spills, noxious agent clouds, and the like. Here, the chemical and biological sensor payloads will come into play depending on the nature of the disaster. As with the border patrol role, it is not clear that active DoD units will be primary responders.
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Non-combatant evacuation operations can be described as military missions on foreign soil to extract non-military personnel from a dangerous situation. Embassy evacuations are the most common example. Micro-air vehicles could prove useful in a supporting role by providing intelligence and reconnaissance, intercepting and/or jamming adversary communications, and signaling rescue forces when the non-combatants are distanced from planned pick-up points. Air Force use of MAV assets could be envisioned for any of these scenarios.
Anti-Terrorism. Anti-terrorism is another activity that takes on a multi-agency flavor especially when focused on the domestic scene. Micro-air vehicles have the potential to enhance anti-terrorist operations especially as covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that could enhance domestic and military authorities’ knowledge of the threat they face in a crisis. MAVs capable of negotiating their way into a building during a hostage situation and able to maintain a covert presence for on-going reconnaissance greatly increase the odds in favor of anti-terrorist forces. MAVs fitted with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon sniffers would aid immeasurably in understanding the extent to which terrorist use of such weapons has contaminated an area. MAV contributions in the anti-terrorism context will probably not come through Air Force channels on the domestic front, even though they may reside within the arsenal of the newly formed Joint Task Force-Civil Support or in conjunction with operations in Homeland Security. The purpose of this task force is to coordinate military support in terrorist situations involving use of weapons of mass destruction.134 Nevertheless, it may be appropriate for Air Force provision of MAVs if the source of the terrorism is in another country and requires MAV long-range delivery.
Limited Raids
Limited raids fall in between military operations other than war and acknowledged war in the spectrum of conflict. These are conducted by nation states against state or non-state actors using standard military or special operations forces. Categorically, they involve a single or small number of engagements and are conducted over a time interval spanning minutes to several days.
In all important respects, limited raids look like conventional military operations in content and tenor. They differ from more general warfare in that no a priori “state of war” exists between the combatants within the international legal understanding of the phrase, although raids could be used by the attacked party as justification for declaring war. Limited raids are typically used to “send a message,” to “show resolve,” or as a form of retaliation. The may also be used within the context of enforcement of international sanctions or military occupational duties. Operation DESERT FOX conducted by the U.S. against Iraq in 1998 is an example of a limited raid.
Air Force micro-air vehicles could make contributions in support of limited raids by virtually all of the means mentioned previously: pre-strike reconnaissance, targeting, and post-strike battle damage assessment; electronic warfare to include signals intelligence and communications intercept/jamming; communications relay; target area weather monitoring; combat search and rescue in those cases where aircrew survive shoot down; offensive counterair operations including SEAD; and offensive counterinformation to include deception and psychological operations. The MAVs could be used for strategic attack if the raid were to have that purpose. MAVs might prove particularly attractive for use in this context in that they are expendable and do not put friendly personnel at risk; two considerations that are usually significant factors in the decision to launch a limited raid. Due to their stealth, MAVs also facilitate surprise, which is an important element if limited raids are to achieve maximum effect.
Insurgent Warfare
Insurgent warfare has the following characteristics:
- It almost always involves protracted struggles
- It relies on an underground infrastructure for concealment and intelligence and siphons support from the target population
- It uses military actions as a complement to the political struggle, not as the dominant means to attain success
- It employs guerilla tactics135
Given the capabilities posited earlier for micro-air vehicles and the description of insurgent warfare outlined above, it is a simple extrapolation to conceive of how such weapons could prove extremely amenable to insurgent forces. What may be less obvious, but no less true, is that MAVs – along with other specialized weapons and tactics – could support an option for conduct of insurgent type warfare by U.S. forces.
Much is made in the literature about how the U.S. must prepare itself for future contingencies in which enemy forces may employ asymmetric strategies as a means to overcome U.S. conventional superiority. Very rarely do you see proponents of the notion that the U.S. should itself adopt such asymmetries to enhance its combat power. Micro-air vehicles hold this attraction. More explicitly, they make possible the idea of employing combat power in a manner that resembles an asymmetric strategy like insurgent warfare at least with respect to the use of guerilla tactics.
Guerrilla warfare is usually perceived as the means used by a weak entity to fight a strong one. This has dictated certain tactics such as heavy leverage of the element of surprise, operations in small units or cells, rapid massing of locally superior forces on isolated enemy units, actions to cause harassment, demoralization, and embarrassment of enemy forces, and eschewing the taking and holding of terrain.136
When one considers the probable types of warfare that the U.S. may be faced with in the future, one possibility that stands out as highly likely is what has been termed “dirty war.”137 If faced with such a future where failed states and non-state actors combine to produce complex and “dirty” conflict, the U.S. should use strategies that avoid heavy involvement of ground forces, that minimize exposure of personnel and materiel to attack, and that employ tactics which work well against a diffuse and fleeting enemy. Strategies of this nature would require new concepts of operations and complementary technologies to make them successful. Given their characteristics of stealth, flexibility, potential ubiquity through low-cost, mass manufacture and employment, micro-air vehicles could fit quite nicely within strategies that take on the character of insurgent warfare. Through stealth and versatility, they could provide wide area intelligence, conduct surprise hit-and-run attacks, and be easily operated by limited numbers of indigenous personnel sympathetic to the U.S. cause as the Mujahadeen did using Stinger missiles against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Depending on the goals of the campaign, successful operations along these lines might not require the capture of terrain, would create frustration and embarrassment among enemy forces while limiting the exposure of U.S. personnel to attack. Such a capability would be extremely useful in operations like Enduring Freedom. This would serve to create the impression of long-term commitment and invincibility.
Of course, in the more traditional sense, micro-air vehicles could prove an ideal weapon to export to insurgencies in other countries that are fighting for interests consonant with those of the U.S. Again, the example of the Stinger in Afghanistan provides a model for emulation. In this context the potential for technological secrets to fall into the hands of enemies would be less of a concern for MAVs as compared with other weapons like the Stinger. This accrues from the fact that the real edge comes not from the technological capabilities resident on the weapon itself as it does from their manufacture. Furthermore, new technologies that come under the title of “anti-tamper” are now available to mitigate the threat of exploitation.138
Conventional Warfare
Conventional warfare refers to engagements fought and campaigns pursued by regular forces under conditions mutually acknowledged as a state of war. The vast majority of considerations for micro-air vehicle support within this context have already been examined in the section on USAF Aerospace Power functions. Only one more observation in this context will be made having to do with operations in urban, mountainous, and forested terrains.
The force structure the U.S. has developed to date is best suited for operations in open terrain as is found in the deserts of the Middle East or the plains of central Europe. Operations that must be conducted in terrain involving extensive urban dwellings, rugged mountains, or forested regions (as exist in the Balkans) greatly complicate securing the goals of dominant battlespace awareness and precision attack. Developing and procuring weapon systems that overcome such obstacles is fundamental to achieving the vision for our future force enunciated in documents like Joint Vision 2020.
It should be evident by now that micro-air vehicles can potentially contribute in no small way towards helping reduce the fog and friction of war that are exponentially increased for operations in these settings. By providing the ability to sense in heretofore denied areas, by extending presence into virtually anywhere on the battlefield, and by holding an adversary continuously at risk from lethal or non-lethal effects from the air, MAVs magnify the effects of our force assets that otherwise would be greatly diminished.
Warfare Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
It has already been illustrated how MAVs equipped with nuclear, biological, and chemical sensors could aid in battlefield detection of these agents and assist in operations to avoid or contain contaminated areas. Further, MAVs could also be used to determine the extent of destruction and develop consequence mitigation plans. Additionally, MAV use in counter-proliferation efforts has also been described. Air Force participation in such efforts would appear to be appropriate. Beyond these, however, once conflict escalates to massive WMD use, other uses for MAVs would appear to be of limited consequence.
Chapter 5
Summary and Concluding Thoughts
Micro Air Vehicles are a class of UAVs whose time is near. A confluence of key events is about to occur that will enable these versatile aircraft to have military effects disproportionate to their diminutive size. The supporting technologies are progressing rapidly to the point that simple, short-duration missions will soon be possible. With time, more varied and enduring applications. At the same time, the need for weapons that help achieve the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics will be more pressing than ever. The military utility of MAVs in this context can only grow as they come closer to realizing their potential.
At the start, micro-air vehicles could find application by providing localized imaging reconnaissance. Then as other key technologies mature, uses may expand to electronic warfare, nuclear, biological, and chemical agent warning, and battle damage assessment. Later still, we could see MAVs autonomously flying through air shafts reconnoitering deeply buried bunkers and reporting back to enable proper configuration of penetrating weapons. MAVs might then proliferate throughout the force structure becoming as much an “arrow in the quiver” of the foot soldier as another round on the hard point of a fighter’s wing.
As micro-air vehicles become credible weapon systems widely available and reliable, they will be used at virtually all levels of conflict, from peace operations to battlefields on which weapons of mass destruction may be unleashed. While the Air Force may not be the operator of MAVs in all of these contexts, it will be the appropriate one in a great many of them.
Perhaps the most revolutionary application of micro-air vehicles would be their use within the context of “swarms.” Whether swarming is accomplished by a great number of vehicles that are in no way integrated with each other or by groups that share sensor data, centralized command and control, distributed processing, and/or aggregated lethality, such an employment concept will present incredible difficulties for any defensive scheme. Imagine being tasked with fending off attacks of swarms of MAVs as they engage from literally every direction around one’s position with stealth and autonomic single-mindedness. The defender will face incredible challenges in detection, targeting, and engagement multiplied many times over. Swarming MAVs will give the offensive side a distinct advantage not easily countered and will represent the exquisite marriage of quality with quantity.
While utility in the operational performance dimension argues for the pursuit of micro-air vehicles, there are other reasons as well. These include low cost of development and acquisition as well as of operations and maintenance. Since many applications will entail a “wooden round” (i.e., single use) concept, the logistics trail will be minimal. The ability of MAVs to support traditional missions as well as their potential to enable implementation of new military strategies make them ideal agents to assist transitions to alternate force structures and/or concepts of operation. There are likely to be spin-offs for commercial and space uses as well. The micro-air vehicle is hardly a system concept that will find itself restricted to the alternatives presented here or to the military realm alone.
For certain, the potential of micro-air vehicles is not unbounded and key shortcomings will have to be mitigated for these aircraft to have the minimal utility necessary to make them viable candidates to perform Air Force missions. Among the challenges yet to be overcome are achieving reasonable range capabilities in distance traveled and radio frequency transmission radius, prolonging endurance both in the air and post-flight for unattended ground operation, enhancing navigational precision, and acquiring true autonomy. While these challenges may seem daunting now, it does not seem unreasonable to look ahead in 20 years to foresee a time when they may be well in hand.
If the Air Force is to have a share in a future involving micro-air vehicles, now is the time it must step up to the plate and embrace them as its own. A recent article in Joint Forces Quarterly makes this argument quite pointedly:
The military systems of 2020 and 2030 will be based on the science of the year 2000 just as the high-tech weapons of today are the results of investments made by our predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s. . . .
The 20 to 30 years needed for basic scientific discovery to evolve into a fielded system means that now is when we must understand the concepts of far future war and the capabilities we will want. . . .
Great breakthroughs occur at the interface between scientific disciplines and organizations. . . .
At present the services only influence product development in the latter stages of the R&D cycle. Industry experience, however, has shown that if the customer and designers share in all product development decisions from the initial design, the degree of innovation is much higher, the product acceptance rate is much greater, and the pace of technological change is much faster.139
The micro-air vehicle is a concept “at the interface between scientific disciplines and organizations.” It has reached the point in its development life cycle that operators (i.e., “the customer”) can have a decided effect on its progression. The window of opportunity is now presenting itself. Now is the time to open the shutters.
In 1991 the USAF commenced Operation DESERT STORM with massive, synergistic, and devastating attacks on the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System and proceeded over the course of days to render it useless. In 1999 the USAF again went to war, but this time over Yugoslavia in Operation ALLIED FORCE, and the going was a bit more difficult. While success was achieved at suppressing the Serbians’ air defenses, the threat they posed in this regard was far from emasculated at war’s end. This enemy had learned some lessons and applied asymmetric strategies such as replacing air defense communication links with cellular technologies. Is the next enemy going to be even better? How will the USAF craft a strategy to defeat the next integrated air defense system it faces and the thinking enemy behind it? To remain successful, the USAF will have to continue advancing itself, adding new capabilities to its bag of tricks, and adopting counter-strategies of its own. Micro-air vehicles could be a partial answer to this challenge. These aircraft require a high degree of systems integration, which is a relative strength of the U.S. industrial establishment. If pursued aggressively, MAVs could be in the hands of U.S. warfighters well ahead of potential adversaries who would need to make substantial efforts to copy and/or counter them. Thus, they could prove a substantial asymmetric advantage for the U.S. to enjoy in the intervening time between introduction and imitation.
If this paper has appeared to place too much faith in technological solutions, then let it be tempered by the following sage advice. In developing our strategies for the future, we have to be careful not to place too much trust in nor depend solely on technology as the end or be all. As the studied strategist, Colin S. Gray, cautions,
New technology, even when properly integrated into weapons and systems with well-trained and highly motivated people, cannot erase the difficulties that impede strategic excellence. . . . Progress in modern strategic performance has not been achieved exclusively through science and technology.140
Developing, procuring, and integrating micro-air vehicles into our fielded forces must be accompanied by the evolution of appropriate tactics, the development of an experience base gained through experimentation and realistic training, and the creation of responsive organizations to operate them professionally. Only then will MAVs reach their true potential.
If all of these pieces – technology, operational constructs, experience, and organization – can be brought together holistically, then the USAF will have gained another advantage against almost any opponent. The enemies of today have learned the hard way that U.S. aerospace power is massive, flexible, and overwhelming. It inspires awe. This hard-won respect magnifies its influence and enhances its prestige as an instrument of national policy. Micro-air vehicles add a new dimension to this instrument, one that may be characterized by stealth, seeming ubiquity, and persistence. Pursuit of MAVs can only add to what Eliot Cohen has described as the “mystique of U.S. air power . . . a mystique that is in the American interest to retain.”141 |
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