• Avian influenza is a contagious disease caused by a strain of the influenza virus.
• Avian flu has two forms, a mild form and a fatal form that can cause death within 24 hours of the first appearance of symptoms.
• The deadly form was first discovered in Italy in 1878.
• All birds are believed to be susceptible to the virus, though some species seem to have more resistance than others.
• Migratory waterfowl – ducks, geese, etc. – often carry the virus, but seem to have the most resistance to severe infection.
• Domestic poultry (like chickens and turkeys) are especially vulnerable to avian flu outbreaks and are the least likely to recover from the disease.
• Some researchers believe contact between waterfowl and poultry may be a frequent cause of epidemics. Live bird markets, where caged birds are kept in close quarters, have also been cited as a way of spreading avian flu epidemics.
• The virus can spread directly from bird to bird, and from farm to farm through contaminated equipment (like cages), feed, clothing, vehicles and shoes. Rats, too, can carry the virus on their feet.
• The virus can survive for three months in bird droppings; the virus can also survive in water for up to four days.
• Health experts are alarmed at how quickly the avian flu virus can mutate to a form that is deadly and resistant to medication. It can also mutate to a form that passes easily from one species to another, or among animals of the same species.
• A 1983-84 outbreak of avian flu in Pennsylvania began with low mortality, but within six months the virus mutated to a deadlier form, with 90 percent of infected birds dying.
• The deadly strain of influenza virus currently found in Southeast Asia is known as the H5N1 strain. It can pass from birds to humans, but cannot yet pass from human to human.

Creation of a Sixth Work Group in DHS PanFlu planning

POLICY PAPER TASK FORCE WORK GROUP

The Policy Paper sub-work group met on May 11, 2006 to review three of the outstanding position papers.  Some of the outcomes of the discussion included:

 #003:  Departmental policy on mandated administration of antiviral prophylaxis, vaccinations (once available), and the required use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) among DHS personnel

§         Dividing this one into two papers to separate the contentious issue of vaccines and antivirals with the more straight forward issue of PPE

§         Add FDA language on liability/informed consent;

§         Issues requires careful review by OGC and Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties before forwarding to Policy for resolution

 #005:  Departmental policy on workforce relocation, telecommuting, social distancing, COOP, and administrative leave during a pandemic.  

§         Review FEMA’s COOP guidance and OPM telecommuting guidance for applicability and consistency

§         Add a opposing views about negative impacts on personnel (i.e., perception of subjective implementation) and effecacy of these measures

§         Expand discussion of potential protective measures (e.g., all types of leave, alternate work schedules, workforce relocation, etc)

 #006:  Departmental policy for DHS employee vaccination prioritization during a pandemic  

§         Reversal of prioritization:  primary by exposure risk and secondary by mission critical function (likely to overlap among DHS personnel)

§         Define exposure risk based on CDC guidelines

UPCOMING EVENTS

• Policy Paper Task Force for the next three (3) weeks will be meeting on Thursdays at 1300hrs  at the Ronald Reagan Building.
• 18 May 2006, Pandemic Influenza Summit for Tribal Leaders, sponsored by HHS, location is Washington DC.
• 18 May 2006, 1^st of 5 Pandemic Influenza outreach partnering with Safeguarding America, location is Chicago.
• 22 May 2006, Pandemic Influenza outreach, Los Angeles Building Association meeting, location is Los Angeles.
• 22-25 May 2006, an Asian Pacific Economic Committee (APEC) transportation work group meeting held in Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam, where Dave McAdams, Policy will be presenting an information paper on what we would like to achieve for exit screening.

WEB PAGES OF NOTE

www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza

www.pandemicflu.gov

www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9nolZ/03-0289.htm

www.cdc.gov/flu/

www.niaid.nih.gov/dmid/influenza/pandemic.htm

www.hhs.gov/nvpo/influenza_vaccines.html